NVIDIA share of four-vendor pool, quarterlyno data
— ratio
on track <= 0.68 · off > 0.76manual ↗
connector returned no usable reading · checked 2026-10-19
Radar · Compute supply and custom silicon · T3 · 2035 · THESIS
In at least one calendar quarter ending on or before 2031-12-31, NVIDIA's Data Center revenue is less than 50% of the merchant AI accelerator revenue pool, defined as NVIDIA Data Center plus AMD Data Center segment plus Broadcom AI semiconductor plus Marvell Data Center segment revenue.
The buildings, networks, and power contracts that outlast any chip generation are being designed around one vendor's rack architecture. If merchant supply splits below 50/50 by 2031, liquid-cooling density, fabric choice, and financing structures diversify with it. If it does not, single-vendor concentration remains the largest unpriced operational risk in the sector.
Registered at 35% on September 8, 2026. Engine repriced 14 times; now 81%.
Dated rungs. Each is scored on its own; the thesis does not get credit for the ladder until the rungs land.
filled bar · my probabilityhollow dot · engineamber date · due, awaiting adjudication
m1 · 2027-12-31 · 50% · NVIDIA share of the four-vendor pool is at or below 70% in at least one quarter.
m2 · 2029-12-31 · 40% · NVIDIA share of the four-vendor pool is at or below 60% in at least one quarter.
m3 · 2031-12-31 · 35% · NVIDIA share of the four-vendor pool is below 50% in at least one quarter.
Registered thresholds. Status is computed from the latest public reading.
NVIDIA share of four-vendor pool, quarterlyno data
— ratio
on track <= 0.68 · off > 0.76manual ↗
connector returned no usable reading · checked 2026-10-19
AMD Data Center segment revenue, quarterlyoff track
11.54 USD billions
on track >= 20 · off < 12sec-xbrl ↗
series as of 2026-06-27
Would raise my number
Would cut it
6 personas on one model (openai/gpt-5.6-sol); other vendors were unavailable this run, so read this as one model's persona-averaged view.
27%
grid-and-power-planner · openai/gpt-5.6-sol
Starting near 0.76, a HIT requires rivals’ combined reported revenue to move from about one-third of NVIDIA’s to above NVIDIA’s—roughly a tripling in relative terms—within five years. My reference class is dominant semiconductor/platform franchises facing credible second-source and custom-silicon substitution; I use an approximately 0.07 annual hazard of a greater-than-25-point share loss, then discount for the 2029 falsifier and adverse ambiguity. Broadcom custom accelerators and AMD growth create a real path, while the total-revenue substitution rule adds disclosure-driven upside. NVIDIA’s software ecosystem, cadence, and broad Data Center line make crossing 0.50 difficult. The 0.98 structural prior extrapolates one AMD total-revenue series, not the defined ratio.
28%
semiconductor-supply-chain-analyst · openai/gpt-5.6-sol
Starting from 75–78%, rivals’ combined revenue must rise from roughly 0.3x NVIDIA’s to above 1.0x—a threefold relative gain. My reference class is five-year share erosion by dominant semiconductor-platform vendors: 20-point losses occur, but 25–30-point losses are uncommon absent a product failure or architecture transition. Broadcom custom ASICs and AMD accelerators could push NVIDIA below 70% before the 2029 falsifier and below 60% later; product transitions add one-quarter downside tails. Yet NVIDIA’s software moat, annual cadence, packaging access, and inclusion of networking revenue make below 50% demanding. I estimate 0.65 probability of avoiding the falsifier and 0.43 conditional probability of subsequently crossing 50%.
24%
enterprise-cio · openai/gpt-5.6-sol
Reference class: dominant semiconductor platforms facing merchant and custom-silicon challengers over a five-year product cycle. From the stated 75–78% baseline, competitors must more than triple their revenue relative to NVIDIA to cross 50%, while NVIDIA continues scaling. I use roughly a 0.05 annual hazard of such a share break; compounding over five years gives about 0.23. Broadcom’s guidance and custom accelerators create a credible path, and any-quarter testing or disclosure substitution modestly helps. Against that, the mandatory 70% breach by 2029 and strict named-line sourcing eliminate many slower erosion paths. The 0.98 structural prior extrapolates one XBRL revenue series, not the defined four-vendor ratio, so receives little weight.
23%
credit-analyst · openai/gpt-5.6-sol
My reference class is five-year share transitions among dominant semiconductor platforms. I use roughly a 6% annual hazard of a one-quarter economic crossover, then discount for the falsifier and reporting rule. Starting near 75–78%, NVIDIA must fall below 50%, meaning the three rivals must collectively exceed NVIDIA in one mapped quarter. Broadcom’s cited 2028 target and AMD/Marvell growth make erosion plausible, but the soft consensus still has NVIDIA above 60% before 2030. If share never dips below 70% through 2029, later convergence cannot win, making the claim conjunctive. Disclosure substitution raises HIT risk; NVIDIA ending Data Center disclosure causes a MISS. The 0.98 prior extrapolates one Marvell series and is not thesis-calibrated.
31%
geopolitics-policy-analyst · openai/gpt-5.6-sol
Using semiconductor platform leaders facing credible second-source and custom-silicon competition as the reference class, I apply roughly a 6% annual hazard of a sub-50% quarter over five years. I adjust upward because the starting share is already about 75–78%, Broadcom’s supplied 2028 target is large, and one-quarter volatility helps. I adjust downward for NVIDIA’s ecosystem moat, the substantial decline required, and the 2029 falsifier. Rivals’ combined reported revenue must exceed NVIDIA’s, which requires more than ordinary normalization. AMD’s total-revenue trend alone cannot justify the engine’s 0.98 prior. Disclosure substitutions add a mechanical HIT path, although NVIDIA ending Data Center disclosure forces a MISS.
26%
superforecaster-statistician · openai/gpt-5.6-sol
I use a 0.20 base rate for a dominant semiconductor-compute platform losing more than 25 revenue-share points within roughly five years. The supplied 0.75–0.78 starting share requires rivals’ combined revenue relative to NVIDIA to more than triple. Broadcom’s stated ramp and AMD’s rising revenue raise the estimate, as do denominator-favoring substitution rules. However, one AMD top-line trend cannot identify the four-company ratio, so the 0.98 structural prior gets little weight. The rule is conjunctive: share must fall below 0.70 by end-2029 to avoid falsification, then cross below 0.50 by 2031; NVIDIA disclosure cessation forces a miss. Ambiguity and quarter-matching risk reduce the forecast.
98% from sec-xbrl-loglinear-bootstrap:li-2. log-linear growth +0.165/yr on the last 16 points, extrapolated from 2026-06-27; P(li-2 satisfies onTrack >= 20.0 at 2031-12-31); proxy for the thesis, not its rule