Fraud identification
VerifiedRandom sample2.9 times as effective; estimated £4.4m saved
2024–25; savings since 2022 · 1.4 million advances worth £0.8bn in 2024–25
Department/NAO estimates; subgroup disparities require monitoring.
Fraud review can focus on model-high-risk claims if adverse decisions remain human.
Collections: Regulated autonomy

Executive brief
A defensible model narrows review; it does not own denial.
AI value · Fraud identification
Verified2.9 times as effective; estimated £4.4m saved
Department/NAO estimates; subgroup disparities require monitoring.
Before
Receives a new claimant request and applies existing eligibility and fraud controls. → Reviews evidence and alone determines whether an advance is fraudulent.
After
Scores new advance requests and refers predicted high-risk cases. → Reviews referred cases; equal high/low-risk random samples monitor hit rate and false negatives.
Human boundary
A human confirms fraud; DWP owns thresholds and fairness review.
Why it matters
Fraud review can focus on model-high-risk claims if adverse decisions remain human.
Before
How the work ran before the change.
Universal Credit advance process
Receives a new claimant request and applies existing eligibility and fraud controls.
ControlThe fairness report does not document a dated pre-model operating queue; random sampling is the evaluation benchmark, not claimed as the full former workflow.
Human decision maker
Reviews evidence and alone determines whether an advance is fraudulent.
ControlHuman adverse-action authority.
What changed
Fraud review can focus on model-high-risk claims if adverse decisions remain human.
Decision rightHuman sets the threshold; AI decides each instance
After
How the same work runs now.
Advances machine-learning model
Scores new advance requests and refers predicted high-risk cases.
ControlModel is a prevention control; it does not make the fraud decision.
Human decision maker and assurance sample
Reviews referred cases; equal high/low-risk random samples monitor hit rate and false negatives.
ControlLegitimate referrals are prioritized for timeliness; DWP conducts fairness assessment.
Exception path
Legitimate referred cases are prioritized; random sampling checks misses.
Decision authority
A human confirms fraud; DWP owns thresholds and fairness review.
| # | Actor | Action | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Universal Credit advance process | Receives a new claimant request and applies existing eligibility and fraud controls. | The fairness report does not document a dated pre-model operating queue; random sampling is the evaluation benchmark, not claimed as the full former workflow. |
| 02 | Human decision maker | Reviews evidence and alone determines whether an advance is fraudulent. | Human adverse-action authority. |
| # | Actor | Action | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Advances machine-learning model | Scores new advance requests and refers predicted high-risk cases. | Model is a prevention control; it does not make the fraud decision. |
| 02 | Human decision maker and assurance sample | Reviews referred cases; equal high/low-risk random samples monitor hit rate and false negatives. | Legitimate referrals are prioritized for timeliness; DWP conducts fairness assessment. |
Work that left the path
Human role before
Benefits staff applied existing eligibility and fraud controls to advance requests, and a human decision maker determined payment or fraud action; the source does not document a dated pre-model queue.
Human role after
Human agents review referrals; random low-risk samples monitor false negatives.
AI role
Scores advance claims for fraud risk.
Random sample2.9 times as effective; estimated £4.4m saved
2024–25; savings since 2022 · 1.4 million advances worth £0.8bn in 2024–25
Department/NAO estimates; subgroup disparities require monitoring.
Anti-pattern
Do not automate adverse action from risk alone.
Questions
Portability conditions
Reputation risk
high