Administrative data can standardize triage only with override and disparity review.
Collections: Human still decides · Regulated autonomy
Executive brief
Public risk scores require contestable targets and override logs.
AI value · Screening accuracy and disparity
VerifiedImproved identification and modest reduction in racial disparity in case openings
Outcome summary links an independent evaluation; fairness concerns remain contested.
Before
Receives an eligible General Protective Service referral and reviews allegations and available county records. → Decide whether to open an investigation without an algorithmic risk score.
After
Uses administrative data to produce a 1–20 future-placement risk score for eligible referrals. → Combine score with qualitative context and decide screen-in or screen-out.
Human boundary
Humans make final screening decisions; mandatory abuse referrals bypass the model.
Why it matters
Administrative data can standardize triage only with override and disparity review.
Before
How the work ran before the change.
Child-welfare hotline screener
Receives an eligible General Protective Service referral and reviews allegations and available county records.
ControlAbuse and severe-neglect reports are mandatory screen-ins and are outside model discretion.
Screener and supervisor
Decide whether to open an investigation without an algorithmic risk score.
ControlHuman policy and contextual judgment; no baseline cycle time is published.
What changed
Administrative data can standardize triage only with override and disparity review.
Decision rightAI handles the default; humans own exceptions
After
How the same work runs now.
AFST
Uses administrative data to produce a 1–20 future-placement risk score for eligible referrals.
ControlScore is one input; target is placement within two years, not a direct prediction of abuse.
Screener and supervisor
Combine score with qualitative context and decide screen-in or screen-out.
ControlHumans may override; high-score override requires documented explanation.
Exception path
Overrides are allowed and high-score overrides require explanation.
Decision authority
Humans make final screening decisions; mandatory abuse referrals bypass the model.
| # | Actor | Action | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Child-welfare hotline screener | Receives an eligible General Protective Service referral and reviews allegations and available county records. | Abuse and severe-neglect reports are mandatory screen-ins and are outside model discretion. |
| 02 | Screener and supervisor | Decide whether to open an investigation without an algorithmic risk score. | Human policy and contextual judgment; no baseline cycle time is published. |
| # | Actor | Action | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | AFST | Uses administrative data to produce a 1–20 future-placement risk score for eligible referrals. | Score is one input; target is placement within two years, not a direct prediction of abuse. |
| 02 | Screener and supervisor | Combine score with qualitative context and decide screen-in or screen-out. | Humans may override; high-score override requires documented explanation. |
Work that left the path
Human role before
Hotline screeners reviewed allegations and available county records, with a supervisor supporting the screen-in or close-at-intake decision under mandatory-referral rules.
Human role after
Screeners combine score with context; supervisors govern overrides.
AI role
Generates a 1–20 future-placement risk score for eligible referrals.
Pre-AFST decisionsImproved identification and modest reduction in racial disparity in case openings
Through March 2019 · Eligible GPS hotline referrals
Outcome summary links an independent evaluation; fairness concerns remain contested.
Anti-pattern
Do not call the score an abuse prediction.
Questions
Portability conditions
Reputation risk
high